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Background: Jos has witnessed a series of civil crises which have generated mass casualties that the Jos University
Teaching Hospital has had to respond to from time to time. We review the challenges that we encountered in the
management of the victims of the 2001 crisis.
Methodology: We reviewed the findings of our debriefing sessions following the sectarian crisis of September
2001 and identified the challenges and obstacles experienced during these periods.
Results: Communication was a major challenge, both within and outside the hospital. In the field, there was poor
field triage and no prehospital care. Transportation and evacuation was hazardous, for both injured patients and
medical personnel. This was worsened by the imposition of a curfew on the city and its environs. In the hospital,
supplies such as fluids, emergency drugs, sterile dressings and instruments, splints, and other consumables, blood
and food were soon exhausted. Record keeping was erratic. Staff began to show signs of physical and mental
exhaustion as well as features of anxiety and stress. Tensions rose between different religious groups in the hospital
and an attempt was made by rioters to attack the hospital. Patients suffered poor subsequent care following
resuscitation and/or surgery and there was neglect of patients on admission prior to the crisis as well as non
trauma medical emergencies.
Conclusion: Mass casualties from disasters that disrupt organized societal mechanisms for days can pose significant
challenges to the best of institutional disaster response plans. In the situation that we experienced, our disaster
plan was impractical initially because it failed to factor in such a prolongation of both crisis and response. We
recommend that institutional disaster response plans should incorporate provisions for the challenges we have
enumerated and factor in peculiarities that would emanate from the need for a prolonged response.
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In a mass casualty situation, there is a sudden presentation
of large numbers of injured people at a rate that exceeds
the capacity of the institution to cope [1]. Traditional in-
stitutional response to such situations involves expanding
of the surge capacity by mobilizing additional resources
from within the hospital to provide care for the injured
patients [2]. This involves mobilization of staff from other
parts of the hospital to the accident and emergency de-
partment and a call out system for staff that are outside
the hospital [3]. A slight diminution in standard of care
will also be endured in which trauma care assets are* Correspondence: drkenozoilo@yahoo.com
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reproduction in any medium, provided the ordiverted from less critically injured patients to more critic-
ally injured, but salvageable patients [4]. Sometimes help
might be sought from other hospitals within and outside
the region [2]. This works well when there is a one-off
event, and preservation of organized societal mechanisms
permitting flow of supplies, personnel and other aid to
and from the hospital. When there is ongoing hostility, in-
volving the whole city, and lasting several days, new chal-
lenges emerge which interfere with this mobilization of
resources from within and outside the hospital. This un-
dermines efforts at mounting an effective response to the
disaster situation. On the 7th of September 2001, Jos, the
capital Plateau state of Nigeria witnessed a sectarian crisis
which lasted for five days and generated several injured
patients which presented to our hospital the Jos UniversityLtd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
Table 2 Body parts injured






*: Some patients had injury to multiple body parts.
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lenges faced in the management of this mass casualties.
Methodology
Following the resolution of the crisis we held debriefing
sessions to assess our overall response to the crisis and
identify challenges that were encountered. Participants
at each session included all heads of departments and
units involved in the response. All doctors and nurses
who were part of the effort were also present as were
key staff especially those who had been trapped in the
hospital for days at a stretch.
We examined patient records from case notes, Accident
and Emergency unit records, operating theatre records
and our crisis registry. We also gathered information from
the firsthand account of those who were actively involved
in the response.
The challenges encountered were catalogued and pos-
sible solutions were suggested. The summary of the ses-
sions was compiled and referred to the hospital disaster
committee for incorporation into the hospital disaster
plan.
Results
Available records showed that 463 patients were regis-
tered in the hospital over four days giving an average of
about 115 patients per day. They presented in surges
however and the highest surges were on days 2 and 3
with fewer patients seen on days 1 and 4. Some patients
were attended to without being registered. Of those that
were registered, the records of 74 were not available,
leaving that of only 389 for analysis. There were 348
(89.5%) males and the median age was 26 years.
Table 1 shows the mechanisms of injury with the most
common being gunshot in 203 patients (52.2%) and cuts
from machetes and knives in 161 patients (41.4%).
Table 2 shows the distribution of the injuries by body
part, the most frequently affected being the head and




Machete/knife cuts 161 41.4






*: Some patients had injury by multiple mechanisms.patients (43.2%). Some patients had injury by multiple
mechanisms and sustained injuries to multiple body
parts.
Table 3 summarizes the challenges encountered in the
response to the crisis. Communication was a major chal-
lenge, both within and outside the hospital and for collab-
oration with other agencies responding to the crisis. Field
challenges included the violence on the streets, the lack of
field triage and the absence of pre-hospital care. Within
the hospital, supplies of consumables were quickly ex-
hausted, record keeping was poor, and exhausted staff
began to show signs of strain. Hospital safety became
threatened at a point both from rising tensions within the
premises and from threat of attack from outside. Some pa-
tients suffered suboptimal care for reasons ranging from
exhaustion of hospital supplies to being forgotten in the
heat of the crisis response.
Discussion
The lack of communication between our hospital and
the field meant that we were totally caught unawares at
the onset of the crisis. Our first inkling was in the arrival
of the first surge of wounded patients. Normal hospital
response to severe trauma begins with trauma team acti-
vation following advance notification. This is the ideal in
isolated trauma scenarios but is even more imperative in
mass casualty scenarios. Communication has been iden-
tified as a key component of disaster preparedness and
response. An analysis of the response to three sequential
aircraft crashes in Texas, found communication to be
one of the major problems encountered in the imple-
mentation of the community and hospital disaster plan
[5]. Its total absence meant that we were completely un-
prepared to receive the first surge of casualties and each
subsequent surge was without advance warning. Com-
munication was also needed for mobilizing personnel
and other resources from within and outside the hos-
pital, and for information and media management as
well as the coordination of response efforts between
medical personnel and other agencies of government in-
volved in the disaster response such as the police, mili-
tary, Red Cross, and other voluntary organizations. The
lack of this communication made the overall response




























Threat of attack from outside
Suboptimal patient
care
From exhaustion of supplies
Forgotten patients
Non trauma patients
Patients on admission prior to
onset of crisis
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place before the introduction of mobile telephony in our
city and we do not have pagers or two way radios. The
existing hospital intercom system and the fixed lines
proved grossly inadequate for the internal and external
communication needs respectively.
Field triage was crude and did not follow any orga-
nized systems. Injured patients were merely conveyed to
the hospital if they were fortunate enough to chance
upon a military patrol, aid workers and volunteers, or
other good Samaritans who were willing and able to
help. The aim of triage is to identify that minority of
critically injured patients, out of the large pool of pa-
tients with less severe injuries so that trauma care assetscan be prioritized in favor of the former. Effective triage
is necessary to screen out the majority of non critically
injured survivors, and results are best when performed
by a trained physician in the field [6]. A change in phil-
osophy occurs in the approach to the management of
mass casualty: the goal is to do the ‘greatest good for the
greatest number’ and not the greatest good for the indi-
vidual [2,7]. Most effective triage systems accept an
overtriage rate of up to 50%, i.e. patients who have been
triaged as having critical injuries when in fact they had
less severe injuries. This high rate is necessary to reduce
the undertriage rate to below 0.5%, i.e. the proportion of
patients who were triaged as having non critical injuries
when in fact they had critical injuries [7]. In the absence
of systematic field triage, a high proportion of patients
brought to our facility had non critical injuries as every
injured patient was evacuated to the hospital. Higher
overtriage rates paradoxically, increase the critical mor-
tality by putting an avoidable strain on the resources
needed to manage the critically injured and is therefore
undesirable [8].
The absence of a trauma system in our setting meant
that there was no prehospital care. It is therefore reason-
able to expect that preventable deaths must have oc-
curred in the field. Chances of survival following injuries
depend on how fast the patient can be evacuated to a fa-
cility that is able to provide treatment for their injuries.
Movement in the field was hazardous for victims,
medical personnel and even the military. For this reason,
it was extremely difficult to mobilize staff to the hospital
to relieve those that were over-worked; in any case, it
was not possible for staff that had been at work for sev-
eral hours at a stretch to go home for the same reason.
Some personnel were on ground for 72 to 96 hours
without relief. Evacuation of the casualties was left
mainly to security personnel. Non military personnel
who carried out rescue did so at great personal risk.
Some medical personnel who braved the streets were
attacked, and when a 24 hour curfew was imposed on
the city and its environs, such attacks were as likely to
come from military personnel enforcing the curfew as
they were to come from rioting civilians breaking it.
There was a lag in the take off of the hospital re-
sponse, due to lack of prior warning. Once it started
however, it was efficient in the first 24 to 48 hours. Sub-
sequently supplies began to run out with a resultant dip
in the standard of care. Intravenous fluids, dressing ma-
terial, splints, essential drugs, sterile instruments and
blood soon ran out. We noted particularly that patients
requiring large volumes of blood transfusion for resusci-
tation in the ER often depleted the blood bank reserves
without surviving, in the process putting a huge strain
on the availability of the product for those that required
it for surgical operations. This explains why some
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avoiding blood transfusion in such situations [9].
Supplies had been mobilized from other parts of the
hospital as the ER reserves ran low, but it was not possible
to replenish these sources as they became exhausted. Even
when certain supplies were available in the main hospital
store, the myriad of challenges made their availability im-
possible. For example, while the ER and wards had run
out of supplies of sterile dressing materials, the main hos-
pital store had enough stock to last 90 days. These were
not available however because the head of stores who had
access and authority to release them was not on the prem-
ises. Communicating with him was a challenge. When
contact was established, he could not come because of the
violence in his neighborhood. There was a pool of duty ve-
hicles to convey him, but most drivers were not on the
premises and couldn’t come in either. When a driver was
mobilized, he required security personnel for protection.
The mandate, and preoccupation, of the security per-
sonnel of course, was maintenance of law and order, not
escort. Such was the nature of the largely logistic problems
encountered. The food supplies of the hospital were soon
depleted too because not only patients had to be fed, but
all people taking refuge in the hospital.
Record keeping was haphazard. Some patients had no
medical records. Some had but these were incomplete.
Personnel who attended to patients with trivial injuries
often moved on to other patients without documenting.
Only those who went on to have surgery had detailed
and accurate documentation of their treatment. Poor
record keeping is ubiquitous in the management of mass
casualties but accurate record keeping ensures continu-
ity of care, avoids duplication of efforts, and allows a
retrospective analysis of the response effort at debriefing
[2,7]. It is recommended that tags (which may be lami-
nated) should be used for identification and teams
trained to use short forms and concise writing in keep-
ing patient records under such situations [1,7].
Hospital personnel who were trapped in the hospital
for over 72 hours soon began to manifest features of
physical and mental stress. Overwork was a major factor,
but in addition, there was anxiety for personal safety,
fear for the lives of loved ones, and worry over the even-
tual outcome of the crisis. The sight of severely injured
casualties often with grotesque wounds, and the charred,
dismembered corpses deposited on the floor outside the
morgue (the morgue itself was filled beyond capacity)
contributed to the stress. Some people too had narrowly
escaped death at the hands of rampaging mobs, prior to
finding refuge in the hospital. Acute stress disorders and
have been known to accompany the experiencing of
such traumatic events and could be a forerunner of Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Although more com-
monly described among survivors (direct victims) ofdisasters [2], it has been found among indirect victims
such as first responders and the general public [10] and
the need for disaster plans to incorporate provisions for
emotional evaluation and rehabilitation of casualties is
increasingly advocated [2,7].
The Jos crisis of 2001 was in part a religious one. Ten-
sions flared periodically between Christians and Muslims
on the premises, due to the mixed composition of the
large numbers of people seeking refuge there. Most
people, including personnel invariably found their senti-
ments swayed to on one side of the divide or the other
and the ensuing tension threatened to degenerate into vio-
lence. It took the dexterity of top management and senior
staff to douse the tensions and focus all efforts on the
emergency response while emphasizing the need to main-
tain neutrality in the hospital. Despite this, rumors that
victims identified with a particular section were being dis-
criminated against led to an attempt by some rioters to at-
tack the hospital. The perimeter fence of the hospital was
already breached before attack was repelled by military
personnel guarding the premises. Work place violence is a
well documented phenomenon even in peacetime [11-13].
Whether caused by the strain of the ER environment on
the staff, or unmet patient expectations, aggression is
ultimately fuelled by perception, intolerance, misunder-
standing and loss of control [12]. Some patient expecta-
tions maybe unrealistic in the ER environment and some
of it may be caused by the media. In our case some of the
perceptions about the crisis were due to rumours, inaccur-
ate information and faulty reportage by the media.
Eruption of violence in the hospital would have brought
all response efforts to a halt. Such a situation where the
hospital is unable to render any meaningful care to casual-
ties, either because it is itself, consumed by the event (such
as war, earthquake or nuclear disaster) or because it is
overwhelmed by the sheer volume of casualties, has been
termed a Major Medical Disaster [2] and is a situation best
prevented.
In the heat of the response, patients who had been
transferred to the wards following resuscitation in the
ER or operation in the OR often had suboptimal subse-
quent care. This was because attention was focused on
the fresh casualties from the continuing influx in the ER
at the expense of those said to have been already “stabi-
lized”. The trickle of personnel who were mobilized from
outside the hospital as the crises progressed were di-
rected to the ER and OR, leading to neglect of those in
the wards. Some of such patients missed their antibi-
otics, fluids and wound reviews. Some carried nasogas-
tric tubes and catheters for too long and went for
unnecessarily long periods on nil per os. There was near
total neglect of patients who were on admission in the
wards for other reasons prior to the onset of the crisis.
Initial response involved mobilization of personnel from
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near the end of the crisis, five days later.
A unique, if rare category of patients who suffered
suboptimal care during this crisis were patients who, de-
veloping a medical emergency at home, were able to get
to the hospital. Examples include patients with diabetic
crises, hypertensive emergencies and other medical
emergencies. The care of the trauma patients was priori-
tized above these patients even when the injuries were
not nearly as life threatening. A major contributory fac-
tor was the near total absence of internists as part of the
disaster response in the erroneous belief that a mass cas-
ualty situation called for the mobilization of only sur-
geons. Some protocols propose that hospital call-in
plans should focus on doctors in the surgical specialties
and that the inclusion of internists should only occur as
a last resort [14]. While this is certainly reasonable, we
found we had occasional need for the services of inter-
nists because of prolonged duration of the disaster and
therefore, response. Emergencies arising from the (in-
ternal) medical wards, in patients on admission prior to
the crisis were also another instance that required the
expertise of internists. Institutional response to a mass
casualty situation is an effort that involves the entire
hospital. Even non medically trained personnel could be
utilized for simple interventions for patients with less se-
vere injuries that would allow the experts to concentrate
on those with critical injuries. Yasin et al. [15] found the
mobilization of medical students as well as trained and
untrained volunteers to be very useful in their response
efforts to the mass casualty from the Pakistani earth-
quake of 2005 and that was our experience. These have
to be properly supervised and guided otherwise it could
introduce additional chaos that would be detrimental to
the response effort [16].Conclusion
Frykberg points out that because of the rarity of true
mass casualty incidents, experience from an actual event
is the only reliable way to prepare for and implement
the many unique elements of disaster response [17]. We
have since incorporated most of the lessons learned
from the Jos crisis of 2001 into our institutional pre-
paredness for disaster response and indeed these have
improved our response to three subsequent major crises
in November 2008, January 2010 and December 2010.
We point out that the plan should be tailored to the pe-
culiarities of the environment and should anticipate the
challenges posed by a crisis of prolonged duration. For-
tunately, we have not had a crisis of similar duration or
as destabilizing of organized societal mechanisms as this
one since then, but we are guided by the dictum that
anything can happen anywhere, at any time.Competing interests
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